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Farmers, Markets and Contracts: Chain Integration of 
Smallholder Producers in Costa Rica 
Ruerd Ruben and Fernando Sáenz 
The agrarian production structure of Costa Rica is characterized by a high diversity 
of farm types, with a predominance of family-based enterprises. This historical 
inheritance makes the country significantly different from its Central American 
neighbours (Hall 1985, Seligson 1980).1 Large capital-intensive plantations that 
produce for the international markets coexist with extensive livestock haciendas 
and small and medium-sized, owner-operated farms. Within the latter category of 
family farms, two types of producers can be distinguished: (1) a traditional peasant 
sector2, comprised of low-income farmers living in former agrarian frontier zones 
and in rural settlements created by the Agrarian Development Institute (IDA), and 
(2) an important group of semi-commercial farmers that produce both traditional 
crops (such as coffee, bananas, sugar cane) and non-traditional crops (for example, 
tropical fruits, vegetables and ornamental plants) usually reaching competitive pro-
duction performance. Both groups differ with respect to typical farm-household 
characteristics (age, education, family size, and dependency rate), production scale, 
resource endowments, spatial location (access to infrastructure) and market charac-
teristics (access to inputs and information). Rural development policies in Costa 
Rica thus require rather differentiated incentive regimes to address the needs of the 
wide range of production units operating under different market and institutional 
conditions. 
 During the period 1950-1980, a large number of state-funded programmes – 
with subsidized credits, price guarantees for staple crops, input subsidies, and pub-
lic research and extension activities – supported the agricultural sector in general 
and the traditional peasant sector in particular. After 1980, agrarian policies in 
Costa Rica suddenly changed their former import substitution orientation towards 
the progressive incorporation of the agricultural sector into an open-market econ-
omy with limited state interventions (SEPSA 1999, Pomareda 1996). In fact, the 
share of non-traditional agricultural production in the agricultural gross product 
increased from 10 per cent in 1980, to 19 per cent in 1990, 30.8 per cent in 2001, 
and 57 per cent in 2006 (Umaña 2002, SEPSA 2007). 
 The change from import-substitution schemes to a more open market-oriented 
model brought both opportunities and threats to the agricultural sector of Costa 
Rica. Whereas the competitiveness of many new activities certainly increased, at 
the same time a lack of coordination between the government and the private sec-
tor became apparent, inhibiting many peasant producers from taking advantage of 
the new challenges (SEPSA 1999, Doryan-Garron 1990). Consequently, within the 
smallholder sector, both winners and losers are found. The former moved into 
agro-export activities, using new production technologies and achieving vertical 
integration, capital accumulation and economic diversification, while the latter 
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remained with their traditional activities, using low-input technologies and compet-
ing on spot markets (Pomareda 2000). The new agrarian policies in Costa Rica 
could not prevent the former group from remaining vulnerable to poverty, given 
the constraints forthcoming from their limited access to new technologies, institu-
tional innovations, input and output markets, and market information (Gonzalez 
Mejía 1998, Proyecto Estado de La Nación 1998). Hence, the envisaged rapid inte-
gration of different types of farmers into the agro-export sector did not work out as 
expected and high transaction costs and other market failures particularly affected 
the least-prepared producers. 
 To address these problems, stronger relationships amongst the different actors 
involved in the commodity supply chains are required, linking producers with 
agro-processing firms and consumer outlets. Contract farming is frequently men-
tioned as a possible way to overcome – or at least considerably reduce – problems 
occasioned by market and information failures and to provide a better institutional 
environment for integrating primary producers into the market. The potential role 
of contract farming is sometimes considered attractive as a mechanism for incorpo-
rating small and low-income farmers into the open-market economy (Glover 1984, 
Key and Runsten 1999). In addition, contracts are usually considered as a device 
for reducing risk and as a strategy for guaranteeing continuous supply (Glover 
1987, Grosh 1994). This is particularly important during the initial phase of non-
traditional agro-export production, when contracts provide farmers with the secu-
rity for enabling the necessary investments. In practice, however, a wide variety of 
contractual arrangements is likely to coexist, and local farmers may be able to bar-
gain different delivery conditions that serve their particular interests (Key and 
Runsten 1999). 
 The literature on contract farming presents two opposite views regarding the 
potential of this alternative market institution as a bridge between smallholders and 
agro-processing firms. While some authors warn against the downside of contract-
ing arrangements due to the exclusion of smallholders and their unequal bargaining 
opportunities (Gwynne 2003, Murray 1997, Rickson and Burch 1996), other re-
searchers argue that contracts offer a mechanism for integrating smallholders into 
dynamic markets by reducing market failures in credit, insurance and information 
(Singh 2002, Key and Runsten 1999, Grosh 1994). 
 In this article, we provide new evidence regarding the importance of contracts 
for the integration of smallholders into profitable specialized niche markets. We 
analyse the rationale and effectiveness of different types of contractual regimes in 
small-scale production and trade of pepper and chayote in Costa Rica. Both com-
modities have strongly increased their importance as a non-traditional crop since 
the 1990’s, both for the local market and for export. These crops are very suitable 
for small-scale farmers, since production requires frequent attention and detailed 
care throughout the cropping cycle. This gives family farms a competitive advan-
tage compared to large commercial plantations. In addition, pepper and chayote are 
attractive diversification crops that do not require complex technologies or ma-
chinery and can reach high and fairly stable yields per hectare. A major drawback 
for small farmers are the entry costs during the start-up phase, caused by initial 
investments for crop establishment and the maturation time before the first harvest 
takes place. Contracts may therefore be helpful as a strategy for overcoming these 
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constraints and enable market access while controlling uncertainty (Dorward 2001). 
 In the Costa Rican non-traditional sector we distinguish between different mar-
ket configurations ranging from competitive markets to a local monopsony.3 The 
latter situation frequently occurs when markets are thin and processing is con-
trolled by a limited number of firms. Regarding delivery conditions, three types of 
contractual arrangements coexist, based on product deliveries without any con-
tracts, or through verbal or written commitments. Producers may be simultaneously 
involved in different networks. Attention is focused on the implications of different 
market situations and contractual arrangements for farmers’ resource use decisions 
and their investment and management strategies. When farmers depend on a single 
trader-processor, investments are likely to be more risky. Local competition may 
therefore be required as an incentive for enhancing farmers’ willingness to improve 
input use in non-traditional production. 
 Particular emphasis is laid on the changing nature of the contracts during the 
household life cycle. Farmers need formal contracts in early phases of the crop 
establishment process to safeguard their initial investments, but in subsequent 
phases and when more competitive market conditions arise, they can rely more on 
verbal commitments (Lutz and van Tilburg 1998). The latter are far more difficult 
to enforce and could easily lead to disloyal behaviour. Contracts can thus serve as a 
vehicle for overcoming transaction and information costs, but lose their function 
when farmers become further integrated into the market.  
 This study draws on field surveys amongst (a) 50 pepper producers (represent-
ing 65 per cent of all pepper producers) living in peasant settlements in the north-
ern region of Costa Rica (Huetar Norte region) and (b) 120 chayote farmers (repre-
senting almost a quarter of all national chayote producers) located in Ujarrás in the 
southern Central Valley. All farmers in the survey belong to the peasant small-
holder sector (with farm areas up to 15 ha and cultivated area of export crops of 2-
4 ha). Information was collected regarding farm characteristics (farm size, soil 
quality as perceived by the farmers, access to credit), household characteristics 
(family size, age, gender, education, farming experience measured as the number 
of years involved in crop production; risk attitudes), production systems (land use, 
input applications, yields), exchange regimes (prices, volumes, quality grades) and 
contractual conditions (payment procedures, cost-sharing arrangements). The 
analysis relies on an institutional economics approach, using statistical procedures 
for identifying the determinants of contract choice and the implications for farm-
ers’ production, marketing and investment decisions (Saenz and Ruben 2004, 
Ruben et al. 2001). We provide here the conceptual and generic conclusions re-
garding the feasibility of contract farming for different types of rural households 
under specific market and institutional regimes. 
Contract farming 
The widespread existence of market failures in developing countries limits the abil-
ity of smallholders to become involved in new commercial activities that require 
high initial investments and specialized inputs (Cook and Chaddad 2000). Imper-
fect markets and high transaction costs are typically caused by poor market infra-
structure and farmers’ limited access to information on market opportunities and 
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production technologies (Harriss-White 1999, Magnusson and Ottoson 1996). 
While these causes are largely exogenous, other dimensions of market failure tend 
to be household-specific. Farmers have different resource endowments and often 
perceive multiple objectives that reflect their behaviour regarding risk and uncer-
tainty (Ellis 1988, Ruben et al. 1994). Most small and medium-size farms are fam-
ily enterprises with interlinked decision-making regarding production, consump-
tion and investment goals (Ellis 1988, Sadoulet and de Janvry 1995). Even where 
markets do exist, they may selectively fail for particular categories of farmers, ren-
dering commercial production less feasible (de Janvry et al. 1991). If markets are 
thin for specific goods or for particular inputs, prices are no longer determined by 
supply and demand, but institutionally defined. These market failures thus directly 
affect farmers’ allocative decisions regarding land use, labour intensity and in-
vestments. 
 New institutional economics approaches claim that market failures lead either 
to the emergence of a surrogate institution for allowing transactions to take place, 
or to a failure of exchange to occur (Stiglitz 1989). Local institutions emerge as a 
response to missing markets in an environment of pervasive risks, incomplete mar-
kets and information asymmetry (Key and Runsten 1999, Harriss-White 1999). 
New exchange arrangements that appear for dealing with market and information 
failures often perform several market functions simultaneously (Lutz 1994). Such 
arrangements are frequently based on vertical and/or horizontal market integration. 
 Contract farming can be regarded as an institutional response to imperfections 
in markets for credit, insurance, information, factors of production and output, as 
well as a device for reducing transaction costs associated with search, screening, 
exchange, bargaining and enforcement (Key and Runsten 1999, Dorward 2001). 
Contracts can be characterized as ‘agreements between farmers and firms – either 
verbal or written – specifying one or more conditions of production and marketing 
of the farmer’s crop’ (Glover 1984). For different types of market failures, contract 
farming may be a welfare-improving governance device (Schejtman 1994, Grosh 
1994, Key and Runsten 1999). Though contract farming is often claimed to con-
tribute significantly to economic development, results of case studies regarding the 
implications of contract farming for smallholders’ welfare are less conclusive 
(Glover 1990, Porter and Phillips-Howard 1997). Benefits of contracting schemes 
seem to depend much on the specific contractual terms, the technical characteris-
tics of the crop, the market environment and the socio-political context.  
 Recent contributions to contract choice literature suggest that the nature of con-
tractual arrangements is likely to vary substantially for (a) different types of pro-
ducers and (b) different market conditions (Dorward 2001). Formal contracts are 
likely to be preferred by less-endowed and risk-averse farm households. Small-
holders with scarce productive assets (land, family labour, farming experience) or 
with limited access to market outlets possess few alternative options and may 
therefore be willing to engage in contractual arrangements. Such farmers generally 
face low opportunity costs of labour, are less able to obtain credit through formal 
lending institutions and thus possess scarce options for self-insurance. Conse-
quently, given their restricted bargaining power and limited exit options, such 
farmers are considered an attractive party to enter into a contract with a trader or 
processing firm (Key and Runsten 1999). Otherwise, farmers with more resources 
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and a longer experience may be able to deliver their products on the spot market 
and can bargain better delivery conditions with processing firms. 
 Prevailing local market conditions also influence farmers’ production and ex-
change decisions. While contract farming generally emerges in a situation of mo-
nopsony markets for non-traditional crops (Glover and Kusterer 1990, Grosh 1994, 
Key and Runsten 1999), it can also provide an important contribution to further 
market development. In new areas of production, buyers can stimulate supply by 
offering input delivery and cost-sharing contracts to growers. Once production has 
started, the buyer enforces the contracts through its monopsony power. This also 
implies that production losses (due to weather, pest or diseases) and quality prob-
lems can easily be transferred downwards to the farmer. 
 However, if other firms enter into the same region, or when farmers become 
more experienced and organized to supply each other with information and assis-
tance, buyers can no longer exercise full market power and profitability of con-
tracts will decrease. In a more competitive market environment, growers gain the 
ability to choose among various contract suppliers and the latter must thus compete 
(Key and Runsten 1999, Escobal et al. 2000). This may lead to free-rider behaviour 
by new buyers, taking advantage from services provided by the first-mover firm. 
Hence, contracts can be expected to become less profitable once market conditions 
become more competitive. Furthermore, the possibility of default increases in a 
more competitive environment, increasing the suppliers’ contract enforcement 
costs (Glover and Kusterer 1990). When producers start organizing themselves, 
this increases their bargaining power and offers possibilities to disseminate infor-
mation from contract farmers to non-contract farmers. From a farmers’ perspective, 
contracts will become less attractive in an established and stable market with buy-
ers competing on prices (Key and Runsten 1999). The utility of abiding by the con-
tract must be greater than what could be received at alternative outlets. But even 
when buyers cannot enforce contracts, farmers still might respect such arrangement 
as a kind of safety net that can be needed under adverse market conditions.  
 The diversity between farmers and local differences in market conditions give 
rise to a wide variety in contractual arrangements. Farmers with a formal contract 
enjoy considerably more security compared to farmers with a verbal agreement. 
The former are, therefore, expected to attain a higher degree of specialization and 
can be less engaged in off-farm activities. Moreover, farmers with contracts that 
include technical assistance are expected to invest more in fertilisers and pesticides 
use. Higher input applications and more technical assistance will lead to better 
yields and higher farm-household revenues.  
 Contract farming can also be considered as a suitable strategy for promoting 
improved resource management. Contracts provide information on appropriate soil 
conservation techniques (through technical assistance) and might enhance farmers’ 
willingness to adopt these practices. Increased use of soil conservation measures 
will not only occur as a device for reducing farming risks but also because farmers 
have an economic interest to comply with the contracting terms. Another link be-
tween contract farming and resource use decisions relates to more rational applica-
tions of inputs, like fertilisers and pesticides. The buyer may recommend and even 
deliver a package of inputs leading to optimal crop performance and quality. Espe-
cially for perennial crops, the buyer has an economic interest in avoiding soil de-
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pletion and will therefore try to enforce effective use of chemical and organic fer-
tilisers. For export crops that are subject to strict quality surveillance, control on 
the amounts and types of pesticides used is equally important. 
Non-traditional crops in Costa Rica 
Contractual systems are frequently used for the development of non-traditional 
crops. We compare the supply chains for the pepper and chayote, focusing on dif-
ferences in (a) the characteristics of the commodities and (b) the types of farm 
households, (c) market outlet orientation and (d) contract choice (see Table 1). This 
comparison provides insights in the endogenous character of the selected contrac-
tual arrangements (Escobal et al. 2000) and permits to draw conclusions regarding 
the efficiency and equity effects of supply chain cooperation. 
Commodity characteristics  
Both pepper and chayote are non-traditional crops that are highly labour intensive 
with an almost continuous harvest throughout the year, which make them particu-
larly suitable for small-scale production.4 Production technologies and cropping 
systems are fairly homogenous and simple. Timely and frequent harvesting deter-
mines quality to a large extent, and labour is thus a critical factor for delivery com-
pliancy. In both supply chains, commodities are delivered in a fresh state from 
producers to the processor. Options for improving crop quality also depend on soil 
conditions (pepper) and chemicals use (chayote). The supply chains differ, how-
ever, in the destination that the commodities follow in the chain downstream. Pep-
per is basically processed (dried) and transformed according to requirements of the 
domestic food-industry market, whereas fresh chayote continues with little added-
value to retailers and consumers, since options for storage or industrialization of 
chayote are absent. 
 An important source of differentiation between both supply chains is related to 
the technical characteristics of the crop, influencing the farmers’ level of asset 
specificity and uncertainty. The chayote product cycle lasts fourteen months, and 
the crop becomes productive after the fifth month. The infrastructure is certainly 
expensive, representing roughly a third of total production costs. It can eventually 
be used for other cash crops or left unused for a period of time. These characteris-
tics allow producers to adjust their production plans and easily quit the activity. On 
the contrary, the pepper production cycle ranges between twelve to fifteen years 
and the plantation starts to deliver production only after its third year. These char-
acteristics already bind producers to the activity, since the establishment of the 
crop represents a high level of invested effort. Consequently, pepper producers can 
only start up cultivation if a certain relationship with a helpful partner exists (a 
resource-providing processor that commits to purchase pepper) and/or when they 
can be sure that there are enough processors willing to buy the fresh pepper. 
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Table 1. Comparison of markets and contracts 
Characteristics Pepper (Piper nigrum L.) Chayote (Sechium edule Sw.) 
Commodities Perennial tree crop (12-15 years); traded 
in fresh bunches; quality depends on 
maturity at harvest.  
Visual quality inspection. 
Value added in processing (white pepper 
requires higher quality) 
Semi-perennial vegetable crop (14 
months), susceptible to plant diseases and 
quality degradation.  
Appearance inspection focused on 
uniformity. 
Trade with little added-value (only 
washing, grading and packaging). 
Farmers Small number of farmers (75), spatially 
located in traditional communities and 
peasant settlements  
 
Large number of farmers (500) with 
different farm size and experience.  
Two distinct segments: traditional 
producers and newcomers 
Market  
outlets 
Domestic niche market; domestic food 
processing and exports. 
Two distinct market segments, with local 
monopsony and elsewhere more 
competitive conditions 
Competitive (and growing) market, with 
domestic and international outlets. 
No dominant operator; open competition 
between fourteen independent 
processors; eight processors are linked to 
international brokers. 
Monopsony  
market 
Competitive 
market 
Traditional 
producers 
Newcomer 
producers 
Market 
segments 
Young farmers 
Small plots 
Better land quality 
Young plantations 
Specialized 
Low labour use 
Low yields 
Organized 
Older farmers 
Larger farms 
Degraded land 
Mature plants 
Diversified 
High labour use 
High yields 
Not organized 
Larger plots 
Low quality 
Own capital 
High experience 
Hired labour 
Internal inputs 
Small plots 
Better quality 
Capital constraints 
Low experienced. 
Family labour use. 
Purchased inputs 
Type of 
contracts 
Resource-providing (written) contracts 
where prices are adjusted with inflation. 
Farmers commit to deliver in a long term 
relationship.  
Promissory note as guarantee against 
contract breach. 
Verbal resource-providing contracts with 
seedling supply and technical assistance  
Open market exchange (with flexible 
arrangements) in competitive market 
segments. 
Delivery contracts (mainly verbal) to 
guarantee access to market outlet. 
Interlinked contracts (with technical 
assistance, credit and input provision) 
Farmers’ commitments to deliver 
enforced by processor.  
Mostly newcomer farmers rely on 
contracts to start-up their business. 
Producers’ characteristics 
In both supply chains, farm households with different socio-economic and produc-
tion system characteristics are involved. Pepper producers are located in small set-
tlements, spatially dispersed throughout the northern region of Costa Rica. De-
pending on their location, they operate under monopsony or competitive market 
conditions. Farmers in the monopsony market segment are usually younger than 
those in the competitive segment, show higher degrees of specialization in pepper, 
while their pepper plantations are more recently established. Since their plantations 
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are in the early stages, income derived from pepper is lower than in the competitive 
segment, and most farmers need alternative income sources. Therefore, they can 
devote less working hours to their pepper plots. The use of contracts is more fre-
quent in the monopsony segment, where farmers are also more likely to receive 
credit and technical assistance. The mean price for delivered fresh pepper is lower, 
thus indicating the depressing effect of the monopsony market. Farmers’ organiza-
tions are more active in the latter region as a device for compensating the mo-
nopsony power of the processor. Since the payback time for the initial investment 
in the plantation is two to three years, farmers are highly dependent during the 
risky start-up phase of their plantation.  
 Conversely, farmers involved in the competitive market segment usually oper-
ate larger but more degraded plots. They have mature plantations that are more 
productive but also demand more labour. This category of farmer is less dependant 
on contractual relations with processors and requires less technical assistance and 
credit. Since they obtain a better price than in the monopsony segment, their pros-
pects for expanding pepper production are significantly larger. Farmers expect to 
reach higher returns for land and labour under the conditions of open competition. 
These farmers can be characterized as self-confident producers that have already 
passed the risky initial establishment phase of the crop. In addition to the competi-
tive market environment and the prospects for further market expansion, the fact 
that their plantations are already in the productive stage provides them with oppor-
tunities to develop bargaining power vis-à-vis the processors. 
 Producers in the chayote sector are spatially concentrated in a single valley. 
According to their socio-economic characteristics, these farmers can be classified 
in two categories: (a) traditional producers and (b) newly established producers. 
Income diversification is very limited amongst both groups of farmers (only some 
horticultural production was found providing additional income during the non-
productive period of chayote) and therefore the availability of either family or 
hired labour determines feasible cultivated areas. Traditional producers have a long 
history of chayote production and established family roots in the area. These farm-
ers possess more working capital of their own and have larger plots, for which they 
hire wage labour especially for the harvest (labour input use represents 70 per cent 
of total production costs). The second category of ‘newcomers’ comprises farms 
established in peasant settlements, and organized by the governmental rural devel-
opment institute (IDA). These producers usually possess less capital and are there-
fore more dependent on credit provision, input supply and technical assistance. 
Notwithstanding their limited experience, these smallholders still enjoy advantages 
compared to larger outgrowers, since there are limited options for mechanization of 
production and the crop requires large amounts of labour. Therefore, smallholders 
can use their family labour and thus enjoy the advantage of lower search and su-
pervision costs. In addition, the soil quality conditions in the settlements (higher 
fertility and better drainage) are more appropriate for chayote cultivation, and the 
newly established farmers can rely on more advanced production technologies. 
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Market organization 
Both supply chains exhibit a different market organization in terms of outlets and 
agents. The pepper supply chain is characterized as a closed niche market, whereas 
the chayote chain operates in a more competitive market environment. There are 
no spot markets in the pepper supply chain, and only a limited number of produc-
ers that have to deal with few processors. After the year 2000, only one unique 
pepper processor remained, making the supply chain even shorter and more uni-
form, shifting definitely towards a monopsony situation. In the context of a rather 
stagnant market, producer organization for reinforcing bargaining power becomes 
increasingly relevant.  
 Conversely, the chayote supply chain involves more producers (500) and proc-
essors (14), operating in a rather competitive environment, with two well-defined 
outlets, namely the international and the domestic market. However, only eight 
processors have made deals with at least five international brokers, implying that a 
limited number of agents are in fact related to international market outlets. Given 
the large volume of the domestic (and growing regional) market, chayote trade is 
likely to expand in the near future, and more producers might be willing to enter 
the market. 
Contract choice 
Processors active in both supply chains operate at different scales of production 
and rely on a wide variety of sourcing mechanisms. Different degrees of vertical 
integration with primary producers are effective, depending on the level of trust 
between supply chain partners. Contract choice is strongly dependent on bargain-
ing power relations and expected mutual advantages in sourcing strategies by of-
fering different types of contractual arrangements. 
 In the monopsony market segment for pepper, the largest and most enterprise-
oriented processing firm fully specialized in the production of white pepper origi-
nally declined any backward integration with the primary production. The com-
pany only sells white pepper to one large industrial plant in San José, for which 
quality of fresh pepper turned out to be a key issue. In this segment, both written 
contracts and verbal agreements are used to guarantee timely delivery and full ca-
pacity utilization. On the contrary, in the competitive market segment, three com-
panies are competing only using verbal agreements with producers. Two of them 
are specialized in the processing of black pepper that requires less stringent quality 
standards. The latter companies show, however, a lower scale of operations com-
pared to their competitor that operates at the higher quality segment and maintains 
strong backward integration with primary production. 
 Enforcement of contracts was little effective for processors, especially in the 
competitive market segment. In fact, the proportion of defaults on contracts turned 
out to be high: forty per cent of the interviewed farmers operating under a delivery 
agreement proved to be disloyal. This is in line with other findings from the litera-
ture (see Glover and Kusterer 1990, Grosh 1994, Key and Runsten 1999), since 
farmers are tempted to default on their contracts in markets with a sudden increase 
in competition and prices. It also confirms certain weaknesses for processors to 
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enforce contracts and points to the importance of maintaining a high degree of con-
fidence with farmers, thus reinforcing mutual dependence between producers and 
agro-processors to guarantee deliveries on future occasions. 
 The essential difference between the contracts provided by the companies re-
fers to product and processing specifications, the type of guarantees used for en-
forcing delivery, the procedures for price determination, and whether immediate or 
delayed payments are used. Written contracts provided by the pepper firms are 
defined as resource-providing arrangements that include input deliveries (seed-
lings) and technical assistance. These contracts closely resemble quasi-vertical 
integration based on long-term co-investment activities (Hobbs 1996) and offer 
farmers a cheap and low risk way to acquire inputs and technical assistance. How-
ever, the associated risk for farmers with written contracts is being locked-in by the 
processing firm into a long term arrangement, with the consequent loss of bargain-
ing power. Moreover, farmers have to sign a promissory note for the value of sup-
plied seedlings that has to be paid when they default on the contract. Verbal 
agreements offered by the companies operating in the competitive market segment 
can also be defined as resource-providing contracts that include input provision 
and free technical assistance. For the company, resource provision is part of a 
strategy of backward integration to guarantee raw material deliveries to the proc-
essing plant. On the other hand, verbal agreements provided by both companies are 
strictly market-specification contracts that are limited to provisions regarding price, 
delivery time and quantity. The latter types of arrangements refrain from any in-
volvement in the production process and are limited to simple product delivery 
specifications. In practice, we found producers selling their pepper to any of the 
buyers without previous delivery agreement. Farmers’ decision to choose for a 
specific agreement mainly depends on their individual needs and preferences.  
 Most of the chayote processors are family-owned companies that reside in the 
area. Some processors also operate their own plots producing fresh chayote, but 
this production is not enough for fully occupying the installed capacity and there-
fore they purchase additional amounts of chayote from nearby producers. Proces-
sors perform several tasks to match international brokers’ parameters, taking care 
of the transport from the plot to the processing plant, product selection, washing of 
the fruit, waxing and bagging individual chayote, packing in boxes, and transport-
ing the boxes to the harbour in refrigerated and sealed containers.  
 Almost all chayote processors only offered verbal agreements to farmers, which 
can be defined as strictly market-specification contracts. In general, farmers with 
these verbal agreements obtain access to information, input supply, credit and even 
technical assistance, with positive effects on product quality and loyalty. Given the 
shorter production cycle and the relative homogeneity of the produce, such con-
tracts suffice for linking producers into the supply chain. 
Roles of contracts for smallholder development 
Contractual systems with a traders or processors have been used for the marketing 
of pepper and chayote for a number of consecutive years, given the investment 
requirements for crop establishment and the features of an emerging market. The 
analysis on farmers’ contract choice in both supply chains permits to identify three 
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major functions of contracts, namely (1) insurance device, (2) provision of incen-
tives, and (3) provision of information (see Table 2).5 These functions have a deci-
sive effect on the farmers’ decisions regarding resource allocation and supply chain 
integration. We discuss the implications of contracts for guaranteeing smallholder 
access (equity), production efficiency, and long-term sustainability of supply chain 
cooperation. 
Drivers: insurance, incentives and information 
Contracts provide an insurance device to enable farmers to engage in new produc-
tion activities and to gain access to specialized markets. In the pepper case, insur-
ance mechanisms like the commitment to purchase the crop by the processor 
throughout the productive cycle, the guarantee that farmers receive a fixed price 
for their produce, and the protection against inflation by adjusting purchasing 
prices enable resource-constrained farmers to participate in the production of non-
traditional crops, despite market and price uncertainties. In the chayote case, farm-
ers enjoy the certainty of a higher purchase price when delivering the produce to 
the export market. Moreover, a back payment system is in force that gives farmers 
with more frequent deliveries access to a continuous flow of income. These 
mechanisms reduce search costs, since chayote producers can obtain a better price 
without investing much time in identifying markets outlets. 
 Contracts also provide incentives for investment and thus increase the asset-
specificity on the farmer’s side.6 In the pepper case, resource-providing contracts 
offer an incentive that encourages farmers to use more fertilizers and pesticides. 
This advantage can become even larger when transport costs to the firm are cov-
ered by the processor. In addition, resource-providing contracts are effective to 
encourage farmers towards investments in soil maintenance and conservation ac-
tivities. These measures are usually costly and time-consuming, and farmers will 
 
Table 2. Functions of contracts  
Functions Mechanisms 
Insurance Commitment of purchase (P and Ch) 
Price certainty (P) 
Price with inflation correction (P) 
International prices are usually higher than the domestic prices (Ch) 
Promissory of back payment (Ch) 
Frequency in transactions (P and Ch) 
Incentives Delivery of input provision (P) 
Contract functions as collateral for accessing credit from the input store (Ch) 
Soil conservation measures (P) 
Transport costs of delivered produce (P) 
Information Access to (inter) national market outlets (P and Ch) 
Technical assistance by the processor and a public agency (P and Ch) 
Quality requirements and grading (P and Ch) 
Measurement of maturity (P) 
Note: (P) refers to pepper case and (Ch) refers to chayote case. 
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only devote labour time to these activities if compensated by a better output price 
and more transactions. This supports the literature regarding the importance of re-
source-providing contracts and vertical integration for enhancing sustainable agri-
cultural intensification (Kuyvenhoven and Ruben 2002, Key and Runsten 1999). In 
the chayote case, there are no resource-providing contracts but simple market-
specification contracts in the form of verbal agreements. However, this contractual 
form functions as collateral for accessing inputs from input stores. Since frequently 
delivering farmers obtain their back payments every week, they can easily access 
credit for input supply when store owners are aware of these contract terms. Hence, 
the incentives provided by the contract guarantees flexible and timely access to 
credit, instead of the expensive and time-lagging formal credit procedures.7 
 Finally, contracts function as a mechanism to provide farmers with information 
about the structure of the market they operate in. This is very important to prevent 
false expectations and adverse selection problems. In the pepper case, contracts 
include private technical assistance for informing farmers not only about the struc-
ture and opportunities of the market, but also about production techniques and 
quality requirements of the produce. In the chayote case, technical assistance ser-
vices are provided by the Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería (MAG). This 
public extension agency focuses in particular on inexperienced farmers in peasant 
settlements that started to produce chayote under a verbal agreement with a proces-
sor, thus providing an indirect mechanism to inform these farmers about the pro-
duction and market requirements. As private extension tends to be more costly 
compared to public provision, they can easily pay off in terms of higher yields 
and/or less rejection. 
Outcomes: equity, efficiency and sustainability 
The implications of contractual exchange for income distribution, efficiency in 
resource allocation and long-term supply chain relationships are outlined in Table 
3. Contracts can be a mechanism for enhancing equity by incorporating certain 
types of producers into specialized (inter)national markets. Comparing farm 
households’ characteristics in relation to different types of contracts in the pepper 
case, we concluded that contracts are mainly suitable for certain categories of farm 
households, but certainly not for all. We found different types of farmers choosing 
between the three available contractual forms, namely written contracts, verbal 
contracts, or no agreement at all. In a monopsony market, poorer but better edu-
cated farmers with small acreages and limited farming experience strongly prefer 
written or verbal contracts. They operate small areas of non-productive (recently 
established) pepper and meet initial investment constraints, making them reliant on 
non-agricultural income. On the other hand, larger and more experienced farmers 
that maintain high-yielding pepper plantations are far less dependent on single agri-
cultural activities and are therefore more likely to rely on spot market exchange as 
part of their risk diversification strategy. Pepper prices are slightly higher in the 
competitive market, where better endowed farmers without a contract were able to 
negotiate a more attractive price. 
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Table 3. Implications of contracts  
Effects Mechanisms 
Equity (access) Selection of farmers with high labour availability 
Selection of farmers with budget constraints 
Selection of farmers with more fertile plots 
Co-investment/credit targeted to smallholders 
Efficiency Technical recommendations and technical supervision. 
Higher and better input use 
Quality up-grading 
Frequent deliveries 
Sustained quality of produce leads to frequency 
Sustainability Frequency of successful transactions 
Loyalty-enforcement 
Building up reputation 
Preference of frequent and loyal suppliers  
 
The income level and composition have a clear effect on farmer’s contract choice 
and their bargaining power. Income diversification under farmers’ control (for ex-
ample, access to alternative household income sources, such as other cash crops 
and livestock activities) enables farmers to increase their asset-specificity in pepper 
crops, even without the insurance provided by contracts. Since these types of farm-
ers are able to refrain from long-term contractual ties, they tend to be less reliable 
partners for contractual arrangements with processors. 
 In the chayote case, we found farmers exclusively delivering produce to either 
the export market or the domestic market, whereas an intermediate group engaged 
in both market segments. Several farm household characteristics are positively 
related to the export market, such as scale of production and farmers’ experience. 
However, we also find newcomer farmers in peasant settlements oriented towards 
the export market. These producers rely more on family labour and have more 
high-quality land, which allows them to develop small-scale, intensive cultivation. 
Hence, not only traditional farmers are able to participate in the export market, but 
also newcomers making use of their comparative advantages. Moreover, farmers 
that were able to establish agreements with processors are more likely to become 
involved in export delivery. This is plausible since contracts are initially a useful 
device for providing security against market uncertainties. Producers deliver a lar-
ger share to the export market when more intensive production systems are estab-
lished and thus a higher quality of produce can be reached. In other words, richer 
producers use their orientation to export markets as a twofold mechanism: for gain-
ing bargaining power vis-à-vis the processor, and as an additional source of in-
come. 
 The analysis of contract choice in chayote revealed that scale of production is 
positively related to engagement in verbal agreements with a processor, whereas 
experience is negatively related. This is similar to the outcome in the pepper case, 
where young and less-experienced farmers are more likely to become involved in 
contractual arrangements, since contracts provide a certain level of security against 
market and price uncertainties. Moreover, farmers with previous delivery arrange-
ments receive a higher average price compared to farmers selling only in the do-
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mestic market. Hence, the delivery agreement is convenient as a risk-reducing de-
vice for less-experienced farmers.  
 In terms of the efficiency, a contractual relationship between farmers and proc-
essors has a positive effect for resource allocation and product quality. Non-price 
factors involved in the contracts, such as input supply, technical assistance and 
information, induce better input use, improvement of production systems and qual-
ity upgrading, which favours more frequent and successful transactions. These fa-
cilities also tend to reduce risk exposure and enable farmers to adopt improved 
production technologies. However, these advantages may be challenged when op-
portunistic behaviour arises or market conditions change, rendering contract en-
forcement less effective.  
 The analysis of market channel choice indicates that small-scale farmers par-
ticularly need contracts during the early phase of the establishment of perennial 
crops, as a guarantee for their investment efforts. In subsequent phases and when 
more competitive market conditions arise, producers prefer verbal commitments to 
written contracts. Consequently, contracts fulfil rather different roles during the 
farm household life cycle and are shaped differently under various market condi-
tions. In the absence of penalties, pepper farmers with delivery commitments may 
become disloyal to their buyer in markets with more competition. Many farmers 
sell the major share of their harvest to the fixed buyer but also deliver small vol-
umes to competitors.  
 Regarding sustainability, contracts play an important role to intensify farmers’ 
production systems by enhancing better land use and involving more labour in crop 
management and post-harvest handing. Pepper farmers with formal contracts ap-
plied 40 to 70 per cent more soil conservation practices compared to other produc-
ers without any delivery contract. This has positive implications for crop yields, 
generates local employment and possibly also leads to better product quality, 
which enhances mutual confidence and reduces the risk of product denial. These 
effects are mainly accomplished by focussing on specific types of farmers (notably 
less-experienced farmers with large family labour availability, and farmers that 
rely on the crop as their main income source). 
 Frequent and successful transactions require the accomplishment of quality 
criteria defined by processors and depend on the continuous flow of information 
between the contracting parties. We noticed that opportunistic behaviour (selling 
produce to other buyers when a better price is offered) can be effectively controlled 
by the engagement in resource-providing delivery contracts, since farmers prefer 
stable relations with their buyers in order to safeguard their investments. This out-
come is in line with the literature indicating that successful and continuous transac-
tions are based upon reputation between the contracting parties (Hobbs 1996). 
Non-price stipulations in contracts, such as technical assistance, collection fre-
quency, and regular payments thus reinforce long-term supply chain cooperation. 
Policy implications 
In this article we analysed the structure and performance of contracting schemes 
for non-traditional crops in the Costa Rica to identify the effects of different types 
of contracts and market configuations on farmers’ resource use and investment 
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decisions. Special attention is given to the incentive implications of contracts for 
the adjustment of production systems and livelihood strategies. Some main conclu-
sions can be summarized as follows. 
 First, the analysis of market channel choice indicates that farmers need con-
tracts particularly during the early phase of the establishment process of perennial 
crops, as a guarantee for their investment efforts. In subsequent phases and under 
more competitive market conditions, producers prefer verbal commitments to writ-
ten contracts. Furthermore, in the absence of sanctions, around 40 per cent of pep-
per farmers with a delivery commitment became disloyal to their buyer in markets 
with increasing competition. Most farmers deliver the major share of the harvest to 
their fixed buyer but sell to competitors as well. Consequently, contracts fulfil 
rather different roles during the farm household life cycle and are re-shaped differ-
ently under modified market conditions.  
 Second, the study confirms that high risk-exposure of farmers leads to a prefer-
ence for written contracts instead of verbal commitments. This is particularly the 
case for newcomers in the chayote sector and younger farmers entering pepper 
production. More experienced farmers are able to rely on a more risky strategy 
when they possess other income-generating alternatives that make them less de-
pendent on non-traditional crops. 
 Third, the comparison of different market situations indicates that a local mo-
nopsony might generate incentives for realizing fixed investments in non-
traditional crop plantations. The transition towards more capital-intensive produc-
tion systems is favoured when contractual regimes offer (temporarily) lower input 
costs. This illustrates that close complementarities exist between technology choice 
and market organization. 
 Fourth, the analysis demonstrates that contracts provide an important incentive 
for more intensive input use, but that they also tend to induce a shift towards hiring 
wage labour to replace family labour. Thus, family labour can be allocated to other 
profitable non-agricultural activities (such as services, construction, and tourism), 
which can further stabilize household income. This partly confirms the hypothesis 
that contracts can enhance the required certainty for small-scale producers and 
hence increase their willingness to invest. The fact that mainly less-endowed farm-
ers engage in contract farming confirms this conclusion. In addition, contracts im-
prove access to market information, thus reducing a key market failure. Conse-
quently, agrarian contracts might complement policy incentives aiming at more 
efficient and sustainable land use systems.  
Public and Private Roles 
While contracts are essentially private arrangements, there still remains important 
room for public action to safeguard supply chain cooperation and contract en-
forcement. Most important in this respect is public support for the development of 
grades and standards for supply chain upgrading. The implementation of public 
grades and standards (G&S) is of key importance for supply chain compliance. 
Most current quality standards only specify basic physical parameters (colour, 
shape, size, external damages). Even when most producers are aware of the usage 
restrictions for chemicals on produce oriented towards the export market, rejection 
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of full containers still frequently occurs. Since producers can easily sell sub-
standard produce on the domestic market, chemical residues represent a serious 
public health risk. Quality defaults are mostly punished via price discounts rather 
than by exclusion from the market. Even while refusal rates vary according to de-
mand on major target markets, product denial and refusal due to contractual breach 
tend to reinforce the distrust between producers and processors.  
 Clear rules defined by a recognized authority and a well-defined system of 
classification could improve chain coordination and reduce distrust between con-
tracting parties. In both case studies, quality of produce was determined only by 
simple visual inspection.8 These ‘rules’ are informally transmitted to producers by 
technicians and other experienced producers, and disputes on rejection rates are 
frequent. Due to the absence of formal G&S, contractual arrangements still have no 
significant impact on quality performance.  
 In the supply chains of pepper and chayote, small and medium-scale processors 
are dealing with smallholder producers. None of these actors possess the capital 
and human capacity to create and implement private G&S without the support of 
governmental agencies or third party certification agents (Reardon et al. 2001). The 
government should thus play an important role in defining minimum G&S, provid-
ing information regarding new market opportunities, and promoting consensus on 
generally accepted quality regimes, and guaranteeing the enforcement of effective 
control procedures for quality assessment. 
 The latter issues are particular important in the chayote case, where only a few 
exporters have limited control over quality supervision in the main target market in 
Miami. In the pepper chain, private G&S are already applied to the processing 
company and its main buyer, but not to the domestic retail sector with strong com-
petition among brands. The combination of contractual terms with properly defined 
(public or private) G&S may become an important inclusive strategy aiming to 
promote sustainable production. This calls for private-public alliances around 
agreements regarding generally recognized product and process standards and re-
lated to reward and enforcement mechanisms. 
 Finally, upgrading is another important strategy for enhancing value-added 
generation by small and medium-scale enterprises operating in global markets. 
Further processing is a desirable strategy for firms in developing countries, but 
little is known on the contractual conditions that favour this upgrading process. 
Product innovation (better cultivars with more product resistance or better flavour) 
requires in-depth investments in research and development. Long-term agency co-
operation within chains is key to establishing successful governance regimes to-
wards upgrading (Giulani et al. 2005, Doryan-Garron 1990). Market competition 
easily leads to opportunistically behaviour that may delay investments in product 
innovation. Quality upgrading can only be expected through coordinated action, 
dovetailing the interests of a capital-investing processor and an organized group of 
producers. Upgrading in supply chains of perishable commodities thus strongly 
depends on collective action (Giulani et al. 2005). This points to another important 
role for the government (and voluntary agencies alike), which is to foster horizon-
tal and vertical agency coordination as part of an integrated strategy towards sup-
ply chain upgrading and integrated rural development.  
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Notes 
1. The entrance of Costa Rica in the world coffee market in the early 1820s took place in the absence 
of coercive state institutions and enabled smallholder producers to widely engage into commercial 
production, thus triggering a process labelled as ‘rural democratization’ based on a strong rural 
middle class (see Seligson 1980). In other neighbouring Central-American countries, a more dualis-
tic agrarian structure prevailed with far less opportunities for land lease and sharecropping ar-
rangements. Plantation-like regimes using permanent and temporary wage labour in the other Cen-
tral American countries relied more strongly on political and economic coercion mechanisms and 
paved the way for their authoritarian regimes. 
2. This traditional peasant sector produces mostly maize and other basic grains mainly for local ex-
change and consumption, livestock, and some cash crops (coffee and sugar cane). They rely on 
low-input production technologies, maintain simple post-harvest management practices, and family 
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labour may be partly involved in off-farm activities. 
3. A monopsony market refers to a situation where there is only one buyer who meets the supply of 
various producers and will therefore be able to set the purchasing conditions. 
4. Chayote (or vegetable pear) is an indigenous vegetable crop that is grown in mid-altitude areas with 
a high degree of humidity. Production is highly labour-intensive, but also requires some invest-
ments in wooden posts and steel wires. Chayote is part of the local popular diet, but increasingly 
also exported to the USA to satisfy demands from immigrant communities.  
5. See Sáenz-Segura (2006) for additional details on the statistical and econometric analysis for both 
case studies. 
6. This function is intimately related to the insurance role of contracts, since farmers would only in-
vest on their plantations, and thereby increase their asset-specificity, if they have the certainty re-
garding market outlet and price. 
7. Leakage (deviation of input use to other crops) was not a major issue in this study, since most in-
puts only have a specific use. Re-sales to other farmers could occur, however, at the expense of 
lower quality compliance. 
8. In the pepper case the maturity of bunches is assessed by sight (one or two red grains per bunch), 
whereas in the chayote case quality mostly refers to product uniformity (basically size, shape and 
colour). 
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